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Abstract 
There is a widespread public perception of corruption in Liberia’s election process, yet little documentation exists 
on the characteristics of voters and their perceptions of electoral corruption.  The purpose of this correlational 
study was to explore the relationship between gender, ethnicity, physical location, and perceptions about political 
activity during the 2005 national election.  This is essential because election is the method citizens’ use for 
removing incompetent leaders or retaining qualified leaders. Stated differently, democratic accountability is the 
only leverage citizens have to minimize leaders’ corrupt behaviors, foster effective provision of public services, 
and ensure that leaders perform their responsibilities. These factors make it necessary for Liberia’s electoral 
process to be free of patronage, corruption, and conflict of interest. Roderick Chisolm’s conceptualization of the 
internalist view of justification served as the theoretical construct.   Data were acquired from the Afrobarometer 
survey (n = 1,200), which used a representative cross-sectional sample design, and were subjected to cross-
tabulation analysis, a chi-square test, and a correlation analysis.  The results of the analysis indicated that elections 
were perceived as unfair and that gender was an important predictor of perception. The analysis revealed that 26.8% 
of women perceived the National Election Commission as untrustworthy and 79.0% reported that they did not feel 
completely free to choose their preferred candidate. A chi-square test of association confirmed that among males, 
the belief that elections are free and fair was statistically significant (p = .002), though not for females (p = .151).  
Gender was moderately correlated (r = .088) with corruption of government officials.  The analysis also found that 
the theoretical construct may explain the behavior of elected officials, but was not predictive of voter engagement. 
Recommendations to remedy this problem include widespread election reform that focuses on combating negative 
perceptions of voters, particularly among women, and correcting technical irregularities in Liberia’s electoral 
processes. 
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1. Introduction 
The corrupt behavior of Liberia’s public officials has led to political disenfranchisement, social injustice, and 
economic distress for a majority of citizens, a problem existing since the inception of the nation (Boas, 2009; Pham, 
2004; Sawyer, 1992). Corruption persists in the Liberian government today because Americo-Liberians, the 
nation’s founders, proposed to establish a democratic nation but instead implemented nepotism, patriarchy, and 
indirect rule to maintain political supremacy (Clower et al., 1966; Liebenow, 1987). This deviation from the stated 
constitutional principles undermined basic and critical functions of governmental institutions in protecting self-
determination, providing due process, and ensuring checks and balances among the branches of government 
(Crocker, 2003; Rotberg, 2002). This system of public governance has allowed Liberian presidents to misuse 
resources, abuse power, and reward supporters with government jobs. Specifically, the use of presidential power 
to appoint partisans as election commissioners has had an adverse impact on the conduct of elections. This systemic 
and institutional failure is the underpinning to respondents’ (voters) disenchantment and perception of corruption. 
An initial review of the literature reveals that this dichotomy has resulted in widespread distrust, especially in the 
electoral process, which is the pillar of a democracy. This factor has transformed Liberia into a near-failed state 
(Hope, 2010; Pham, 2010).   
The Liberian president is required by law to appoint nonpartisan members of society to serve as 
commissioners to supervise elections (The Liberian Constitution, Chapter X, Article 99, Section A, 1983). In 
practice, past and current administrations have usually circumvented this rule and ensured that their partisan 
candidate is named chairman of the Election Commission (Liebenow, 1969; Pham, 2004, Sawyer, 1992). This 
action compromises the commission because of the inherent conflict of interest, undermines its legitimacy, and 
weakens the government’s ability to foster democratic qualities in Liberia’s electoral process (Elklit, 1999). Such 
biased commissioners are prone to institute complex registration standards, enact extreme financial requirements 
for voting, and permit fraudulent ballot counting in favor of the president (incumbent) in recognition of their 
appointments. This was the situation in 1985 when President Samuel Doe rigged the election, only one of many 
such instances (Berkeley, 2001; Pham, 2004). Furthermore, the reelection of the appointing president gave 
commission members an opportunity to acquire positions in the new government at all levels, irrespective of 
qualifications or civil service merit criteria. These practices and an unfair campaign standard have made voters, 
independent candidates, and opposition parties lack confidence in the equity of the electoral process (Sawyer, 
1992). For example, President Samuel K. Doe hand-picked the Special Election Commission’s chairman, Emmett 
Harmon, who stopped the vote-counting process in the 1985 Presidential Election when it appeared that Jackson 
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F. Doe (the Liberian Action Party candidate) was ahead in 13 counties and winning there with about 60% (Harris, 
2012). Mr. Harmon later appointed a committee with 50 members that pronounced President Samuel Doe elected 
by 50.9 % of the vote (Berkeley, 2001; Harris, 2012).    
The Liberia Media Center conducted a study about election issues in 2011, which revealed that Liberia 
lacks “participatory democracy” because of state-controlled political elites. In addition, 53% of the study’s 
participants indicated that it was difficult to access election information (LMC Summary Report—2011 Election 
Issues Mapping, 2011). This problem was due to media format, production language, and program presentation. 
Furthermore, the 2011 elections media monitoring report, “Because Accountability Matters,” found that Liberia’s 
ruling Unity Party received favorable media coverage about its activities, programs, and progress while its 
competitors (28 other parties) received negative or no coverage. For example, the Unity Party accounted for 88% 
of all political parties’ advertising in newspapers during the campaign season (Because Accountability Matters, 
2011). This gave the Unity Party leverage and other advantages over its opponents, thereby making the election 
uncompetitive.  
This article explores the level of corruption in Liberia’s 2005 Presidential election based on demographics 
and locations of voters. Furthermore, an examination of opposition parties’ complaints about technical 
irregularities in the process (voter registration, vote count, precinct establishment, availability of election 
information, etc.) and nongovernmental organizations’ documented evidence of the ruling party’s corrupt practices 
(mismanagement of public resources, control of the media, and misuse of power) during the election was used to 
validate the perceptions of corruption expressed by respondents to the Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey. A 
correlation between respondents’ (voters’) perception of corruption and physical evidence about existing 
corruption gave authenticity to actual corruption in Liberia’s electoral process. This information is critical because 
voters’ perception of corruption in an election commission can have real consequences for the conduct of an 
election. Pastor (1999) stated that “Mexico’s EMB was traditionally viewed as an instrument of the 
PRI/government, and whether true or not, the perception was widespread and contributed to popular distrust with 
the process” (p. 13).         
The level of corruption in Liberia’s 2005 election provides a baseline in the gap between Liberia’s stated 
goal of democracy and the autocracy that the majority of its citizens characterize as the aim of its government. 
This was revealed by measuring the relationship between Afrobarometer survey respondents’ (voters’) perceptions 
of corruption as it changed with their gender, ethnicity, and residential location during the 2005 presidential 
election. In other words, the hypothesis was that voters’ (Afrobarometer survey respondents’) perception of 
corruption varies according to their demographics and ethnicity.  
A quantitative finding to test this hypothesis resulted from analyzing the Afrobarometer Round 4 survey 
that was conducted in 2008. This population-based survey involved interviews of voting-age Liberians to assess 
corruption in Liberia’s National Election Commission, to rate the administration’s performance in the electoral 
process, and to establish national priorities in administering future elections (Tokpa et al., 2008). The analysis of 
these data along with the electoral institution responsibilities (inadequate opposition media coverage [biased 
media]), incumbents’ abused of public resources (vehicles, facilities, deployment of civil servants, etc.), 
harassment of opposition candidates and their supporters, manipulation of election results, fraudulent voting 
processes, and inaccessibility of precincts provided additional insights on the inequality of voters’ participation 
and parties’ competition in Liberia’s 2005 election. The Afrobarometer Round 4 survey offered the best data to 
analyze because its questionnaire focused on voters’ participation in the 2005 election process. This information 
was critical to identify the existence of corruption in the electoral bureaucracy. In addition, the data gathered were 
analyzed to determine factors that influence the persistence of corruption in presidential elections. That influence 
appears to include the method of appointing election commissioners and dispensing positions and patronage in 
each new government.    
 
2. Literature Review 
This section draws upon an in-depth review of existing scholarly knowledge about corruption in the Liberian 
government, exploring how Liberia’s corrupt origin has led to its institutional failure, fostered dysfunctional 
electoral processes, and ensured uncompetitive national elections. A lack of a competitive election process risks 
accelerating Liberia’s transition into autocracy. 
Public corruption in Liberia (and corrupt nations around the globe) is perpetrated by individuals at all 
hierarchies of government, including elected and appointed officials and civil servants. Therefore, corruption is a 
way of life for public servants and tolerated by government, making most Liberians (and Africans) believe that it 
is acceptable social behavior (Berkeley, 2001; Moyo, 2009; Reno, 2008).  These public servants use their office 
or power to commit specific kinds of crimes, or corruption. For example, police and military officers will commit 
street-level corruption, such as setting up road blocks to demand bribes from motorists (Harford, 2006). A survey 
conducted in rural Liberia (Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh Counties) by Innovation for Poverty Action found that 
43% of respondents believe the Liberia National Police is corrupt (Innovation for Poverty Action, 2010). This 
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finding is supported by the Berkeley Human Rights Center’s survey of the entire adult Liberian population, which 
revealed that 63% of respondents believe that corruption was the primary reason for Liberia’s civil war (Human 
Rights Center, 2011).  
In addition, executive and legislative officials usually commit more serious corruption. For example, the 
Dunn Commission validated that senior government officials were abusing their authority to promote private 
interests and recommended them for disciplinary action to the Liberian Anticorruption Commission, but no action 
was taken. Justice is constantly denied in all aspects (political, personal, and business) of ordinary Liberians’ lives, 
because the judicial system lacks adequate public defenders and investigation resources, and is plagued with 
corrupt judges or public officials (Freedom House, 2010). This situation has led to cases being backlogged, 
prolonged pretrial detention, and prisons’ being overcrowded (Berkeley, 2001; Clower et al., 1966; Freedom 
House, 2010; Innovation for Poverty Action, 2010). Moreover, the publisher of the Plain Truth newspaper was 
charged and imprisoned for a story about the National Security Agency, which is headed by President Johnson-
Sirleaf’s son, supplying ammunition to Guinean dissenters (Freedom House, 2010). Elite citizens receive efficient 
adjudication for their cases, while ordinary citizens cannot get judicial hearings (Freedom House, 2010).         
These situations make corruption in the Liberian government both a management and a political issue; 
both need to be addressed simultaneously. The past anticorruption initiatives (GEMAP, etc.) focused on revenue 
and expenditure in specific agencies but did not address patronage and clan relationships among government 
officials (Boas, 2009; Reno, 2008). Therefore, the culture of corruption remains in the Liberian government. A 
governance survey conducted by Liberia Democracy Watch in 2010 revealed that 64% of respondents trust the 
Liberia Anticorruption Commission’s effort in fighting resource mismanagement and abuses. However, the survey 
also uncovered that respondents “bear a high distrust” for the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary branches’ 
commitment to fight corruption by 75%, 81%, and 81% respectively. In addition, the survey revealed that 
respondents believed Liberia’s judiciary belongs to the “highest bidder,” which means that ordinary citizens do 
not have access to a fair judicial process (Governance Monitoring Report II, 2010). This study is corroborated by 
international watchdog organizations on public governance that listed Liberia as either a corrupted or a failed state. 
For example, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2011 gave Liberia a score of 3.2 on 
a scale of zero (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) among 183 countries and territories (Transparency International, 
2011). This rating ranked Liberia as a highly corrupt nation, a dilemma that makes corruption in the Liberian 
government a primary challenge that requires resolution.  
 
2.1 Electoral Corruption in General 
A study of electoral processes suggests that assessing elections can be made comprehensive by factoring in 
relationships between citizens (political elites and regular citizens) and not judging elections based on polling day 
activity (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005). This method of assessment can provide insight about the disenfranchisements 
citizens experience due to political inequities that, in turn, influence their perception of election process quality. 
Such a method also allows researchers to operationalize “political illegitimacy” and measure it to provide empirical 
evidence of electoral manipulation or fraud (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005). In assessing Liberia’s electoral process 
quality, this approach is valuable in determining the effects of Americo-Liberians’ (political elites) domination of 
the indigenous population (the majority of the citizen) for the past 133 years. In other words, a comprehensive 
assessment will identify previous or existing biases in “the playing field of electoral competition” in favor of the 
political elites or the ruling parties (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005), a goal consistent with this study’s objective. 
The elections conducted in Africa between 1989 and 1999 totaled 109, of which 45 were classified as 
flawed, 15 were boycotted, and eight were protested (Pastor, 1999). In all, 62% of Africa’s elections in that decade 
were seriously compromised, undermining citizens’ choices and threatening democratic processes across the 
continent (Pastor, 1999). To resolve such problems, effective administration including voter registration, 
elimination of multiple voting, and efficient counting of votes, along with assessment of elections, is critical. These 
processes underlie the success or failure of democracy. There is a higher probability of achieving full democracy 
when a nation has an election commission that its citizens perceive as independent, impartial, and competent 
(Pastor, 1999). In addition, these factors increase the likelihood of avoiding flawed elections in fragile democracies 
in Africa (Pastor, 1999). On the other hand, an election commission is insignificant if it lacks the ability to provide 
crucial administrative functions. This was the situation in Nigeria’s December 1998 to February 1999 elections 
that brought Olusegun Obasanjo into power, re-establishing patronage rule, and re-instituting widespread 
corruption in government (Lewis, 2003).    
 
2.2 Electoral Corruption in Liberia 
For much of Liberia’s history, the electoral process was a key strategy that Americo-Liberians used to maintain 
their supremacy in Liberia. They accomplished this goal by establishing a one-party state, disenfranchising 
indigenous citizens, appointing partisan election commissioners, banning opposition parties, and amending 
election laws (Clower et al., 2001; Harris, 2012; Liebenow, 1987; Sawyer, 1992). These kinds of authoritarian 
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practices allowed Americo-Liberians to monopolize presidential and legislative elections for 133 years, between 
1884 and 1980, a faux democracy with effects that persist to this day (Berkeley, 2001). The single party system 
contradicts the selection of leaders through multi-party contests in which candidates freely compete for citizens’ 
votes, thereby recognizing voters as the source of authority for the Liberian government (Huntington, 1991). In 
other words, even though regular elections have been held in Liberia since 1847, between 1884 and 1980 the True 
Whig Party (TWP) had no effective opponent (Harris, 2012). The TWP was the Americo-Liberians’ political 
organization, which control power and govern the nation for ninety six years. However, this history of 
constitutional misrepresentation and disenfranchisement of the indigenous population has made Liberian citizens 
less confident and less interested in the electoral system (Harris, 2006; Sawyer, 1992).   
Most egregiously, the three hinterland provinces with predominately indigenous people continued to have 
disparities in political representation after they were transformed into four interior counties in 1964. The provinces 
were later transformed into counties; four of those counties (54% of the population) were given 8 senators while 
the coastal counties (Americo-Liberians residents) were given 10 senators (Liebenow, 1987). In addition, the 
Tubman administration, during the 20th century, repealed the law imposing one term on Presidential incumbents, 
banned opposition parties, and instituted a police state to maintain single party rule (Liebenow, 1987; Pham, 2004). 
This strategy of doctoring election rules to disqualify principal rivals is still implemented by most African regimes 
(Bratton, 1998). The TWP (the state’s single party) also used a patronage system to select faithful members, 
nominate them at a convention, and elect them into office. In other words, the TWP candidates automatically won 
the election (Liebenow, 1969). Kieh (2011) stated that “Even if free and fair elections are held within an 
authoritarian state construct, they cannot have the desired effect of promoting democratization” (Kieh, as cited in 
Saine et al., 2011).  
The TWP used various tactics for eliminating opposition parties that were determined to get their 
candidates on the ballot. Most opposition parties (disenchanted TWP members in the beginning) were confronted 
with multiple litigations for insignificant violations, subjected to unfair standards, and banned for false allegations, 
which exhausted their minimal resources (Harris, 2011). Any opposition party that persevered until Election Day 
would experience fraudulent acts like ballots not being counted or victories not being recognized (Liebenow, 1969; 
Pham, 2004). These corrupt practices were adapted by the Doe, Taylor, and Johnson-Sirleaf administrations in the 
1985, 1997, and 2005 elections (Berkeley, 2001; Kieh, as cited in Saine et al., 2011; Pham, 2004).  
As just one example, the Liberian President is required by law to appoint nonpartisan members of society 
to serve as commissioners to supervise elections (The Liberian Constitution, Chapter X, Article 99, 1983). But 
past and current administrations usually circumvented this rule and ensured that their partisan was named as 
chairman of the Election Commission (Liebenow, 1969; Pham, 2004, Sawyer, 1992). In addition, the National 
Election Commission’s failure to penalize the ruling Unity Party for using state resources to run its 2011 election 
campaign reinforced opposition parties’ and voters’ belief that the commissioners and the electoral process were 
biased (Bratton, 1998; International Crisis Group, 2012). The institution’s inability to adhere to its constitutional 
mandate can be attributed to its commissioners’ loyalty to the incumbent party, a conflict of interest that 
compromises the commission, undermine its  legitimacy, and weaken its ability to foster democratic qualities in 
Liberia’s electoral process (Elklit, 1999). This was the situation, for instance, in 1985 when President Samuel Doe 
rigged the election (Berkeley, 2001; Pham, 2004).        
This practice and an unfair campaign standard have made voters, independent candidates, and opposition 
parties lack confidence in the equity of the electoral process (Sawyer, 1992). As indicated earlier, the Liberia 
Media Center conducted a study about election issues in 2011, which revealed that Liberia lacks “participatory 
democracy” because of state controlled political elites. In addition, 53% of the study’s participants indicated that 
it was difficult to access election information (LMC Summary Report—2011 Election Issues Mapping, 2011) due 
to Liberia’s underdeveloped media infrastructure which fails to publicize political activities and voting processes 
that are critical to making decision about candidates (Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2013). This situation gives the political 
elites an opportunity to manipulate uninformed citizens to acquire their votes. Since elites benefit, they have little 
incentive to improve the situation (Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2013). The 2011 election media monitoring report 
“Because Accountability Matters” found that Liberia’s ruling Unity Party received favorable media coverage about 
its activities, programs, and progress while its competitors (28 other parties) received negative or no coverage. For 
example, the Unity Party had 88% of all political parties’ advertising in newspapers during the campaign season 
(Liberia Media Center, 2011), giving it leverage over its opponents, rendering the election uncompetitive.  
Even though the Americo-Liberian government was an oligarchy during the 20th century, it wanted the 
international community to accept Liberia as a democratic state where citizens exercise self-determination in 
competitive elections. So the government hosted political activities like party conventions, nomination of 
candidates, and elections, using deceptive political tactics (Clower et al., 1966; Sawyer, 1992). In some cases, the 
TWP, specifically Tubman’s administration, used token opposition candidates in the campaigns and elections of 
1955, 1959, and 1963 (Liebenow, 1969). This strategy not only presented Liberia as a democratic state, it also 
helped Americo-Liberians and modern governments to legitimize their rule in Liberia. The International Crisis 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.6, No.7, 2016 
 
5 
Group recommends that Liberia’s election laws be revised to give the National Election Commission authority to 
effectively regulate campaign financing, party incorporation, party advertisement, and party use of government 
resources (International Crisis Group, 2012). This transformation will give the commission a responsibility for 
teaching election rules to competing parties, conducting voters’ education, and administering disciplinary action 
to noncompliant political parties. In addition, the autonomy will make the National Election Commission 
independent of government manipulation and establish the institution’s authenticity. This kind of accountability 
and transparency will enhance the commission’s democratization.     
There have been four competitive Presidential elections in Liberia since 1985. These elections resulted 
in an increasing number of political parties, accompanied by allegations of corruption by opposition candidates. 
The number of parties and coalitions participating in these elections was as follows: (1) 1985--four parties; (2) 
1997--13 parties; (3) 2005--22 parties; and (4) 2011--26 parties (Africa Election Database, 2012; Liberia National 
Election Commission, 2012). This pattern reflects a surge in citizens exercising their franchise and participating 
in selecting national leaders, as well as competition among parties indicative of improved democratization 
(Soderstrom, 2012). However, holding multiparty elections within an authoritarian state structure does not 
guarantee a fair and equitable electoral process (Kieh, as cited in Saine et al., 2011). Despite multiple party 
elections, the president’s authority to appoint election commissioners and the National Election Commission’s 
dependence on the ruling regime for authenticity makes Liberia effectively an authoritarian state.  
Any advancement towards democracy was also been jeopardized throughout Liberia’s history by 
incumbents including Samuel K. Doe (a dictator), Charles Taylor (a warlord), and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, whose 
strategies resulted in manipulation of the National Election Commission. These nepotistic and patronage strategies 
were established and perfected by the Americo-Liberian oligarchy more than a hundred years earlier (Berkeley, 
2001, Sawyer, 2008). For example, the Congress for Democratic Change Party alleged that the National Election 
Commission was biased in favor of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf during the 2011 elections (Soderstrom, 2012). This 
accusation was partly based on the commission approving President Johnson-Sirleaf’s candidacy for the 2011 
election, even though the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had barred her from holding public office for 
thirty years for responsibilities associated with Liberia’s civil war (Harris, 2012).  International Crisis Group (2012) 
stated that “Some Liberians told Crisis Group they feel uneasy, even unsafe, knowing that those responsible for 
extreme violence during the civil war remain free” (p. 1). Further challenging Liberia’s status as a functioning 
democracy, a study of ex-combatants revealed that they perceived the Liberia National Election Commission as 
biased in governance during the 2011 election. For instance, the Congress for Democratic Change Party was widely 
seen as providing faulty tallies “at a polling centre in Fiamah (Monrovia)” of election results for their political 
party, which resulted in the commission chairman’s resignation (International Crisis Group, 2012). The episode 
was critical in validating the commission’s bias after a recount witnessed by civil organizations, participating party 
representatives, international observers, and election commissioners revealed that the Congress for Democratic 
Change Party had more votes than the Unity Party. International Crisis Group (2012) stated that “While voting 
was peaceful, there were many invalid ballots: 82,074 (6.4 per cent of total) in the first round and 24,587 (3.5 per 
cent) in the run-off” (p. 3). In response to this fraudulent behavior, the ex-combatants classified the electoral 
process as illegitimate and supported their party’s call to boycott the second round of the 2011 Presidential election 
(International Crisis Group, 2012; Soderstrom, 2011). However, Sawyer  argues that in the 2005 elections the 
National Election Commission was free from manipulation because there was no incumbent candidate contesting 
for the office of president (Sawyer, 2008). Overall, these assertions put into question the extent of democracy 
reflected in Liberia’s electoral process. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The corruption of Liberian and African officials is equivalent to a criminal act; indeed, their mismanagement of 
resources, embezzlement of funds, application of tyranny, abuse of power, and institution of wars has placed the 
continent in a deplorable condition. This has created economic hardship and denied civil rights for citizens beyond 
colonialism and Western imperialism (Ayittey, as cited in Powell, 2008). African and Liberian government 
officials usually rationalized their behavior by blaming the international aid structure or global economic 
conditions, a theoretical concept referred to as “internalist” (Ayittey, as cited in Powell, 2008). The internalist 
rationalization holds that “Africa’s condition has been made immeasurably worse by internal factors” such as 
systemic corruption and economic mismanagement, yet “African leaders refused to take responsibility for their 
failure.” Instead, they used external elements to conceal their incompetence (Ayittey, as cited in Powell, 2008).  
This was the situation in Liberia on April 12, 1979, when riots ensued due to President Tolbert raising 
the price of rice, Liberians’ staple food, to gain higher profit on his investment in the commodity. This behavior is 
also called a “stationary bandit” by Tim Olson, a term used to describe African officials who establish or occupy 
a government to continuously steal resources, such as taxes, aid funds, and natural resources, and abuse citizens’ 
rights while providing minimum public good (Olson, 1993). In order to expropriate maximum wealth, Americo-
Liberians and contemporary administrations deny education, healthcare, adequate infrastructure, and economic 
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opportunity to Liberian citizens. These officials understand that the more resources allocated to providing public 
welfare, the less they will pocket (Olson, 1993).  
 
4. Methodology  
This study used data collected and compiled by Afrobarometer Round 4: The Quality of Democracy and 
Governance in Liberia, 2008, a population-based survey of voting-age Liberians conducted from December 9, 
2008 to February 8, 2009. The Afrobarometer Round 4 survey, which was administered by a nongovernmental 
agency, provided a means for measuring voters’ perceptions about corruption in Liberia’s electoral process. The 
survey respondents also answered operationalized interview questions about government inclusiveness, citizens’ 
participation in national elections and community affairs, personal economic conditions, and inequities experience 
by war victims. In this study, the 1,200 participants’ answers were analyzed to gather data about their perception 
of electoral administration in Liberia. This information was then measured to determine the level of corruption in 
Liberia’s electoral process and to test the hypothesis that “voters perceive corruption based on their ethnic, 
residence, and gender status” for acceptance or rejection. This analysis was achieved by adopting a significance 
level of 5 out of 100, computing a degree of freedom, and acquiring a critical value from the frequency distribution. 
In other words, the respondents’ perception of corruption was operationalized by measuring their answers to the 
Afrobarometer survey questions.  
This was accomplished by quantifying, rating, and correlating Afrobarometer Survey respondents’ 
answers to questionnaires that reflect indicators of this study’s independent variables. The variables used in the 
study were as follows:  
Independent Variables 
1. Ethnicity  
2. Residence location  
3. Gender  
Dependent Variables 
1. Question 71—Election freeness and fairness 
2. Question 49C—Trust National Election Commission 
3. Question 15C—Freedom to choose preferred candidate   
4. Question 50D—Corruption, government officials 
5. Question 50E—Corruption, police officers 
6. Question 50G—Corruption, judges and magistrates  
The data gathered from the analysis were used to compute a relationship between the six variables. The 
approach determined whether demographic subgroups of voters living in different residential areas perceived 
corruption differently or similarly in Liberia’s electoral process. In addition, the result was used to perform 
statistical correlations among the variables. For example, survey questions Q71, Q49C, and Q15C provided 
valuable measures for determining respondents’ experience with corruption in Liberia’s electoral process.  
Cross Tabulation Analysis 
 Table 1, which contains data on “election freeness and fairness,” reveals that 15.1% of urban respondents 
and 18.2% of English speakers perceived the election as more “free and fair with major problems” compared to 
10.0% of rural respondents and 9.9% of Kpelle-English speakers, respectively. In addition, more male English 
speakers (20.8%) and fewer female Kpelle-English speakers (8.4%) perceived the election as “free and fair with 
major problems,” while more male (38.5%) and female (38.7%) Kpelle-English speakers and fewer male English 
speakers (23.5%) perceived the election as “completely free and fair.” Overall, urban residents and English 
speakers perceived the elections as less free and fair than did rural residents and nonnative English speakers. This 
contradicts the research hypothesis that “Voters’ (respondents’) ethnicity is related to their perception of corruption 
in Liberia’s election processes, with the Kpelle speakers perceiving corruption more than the English speakers.” 
Similarly, it contradicts the hypothesis that rural residents perceive more corruption than urban residents do. 
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Table 1: Q71—Election Freeness and Fairness 
It may be that urban residents and English speakers are more educated and aware of corruption, so this 
counteracts their self-interest. In any case, perceptions of corruption are high enough to leave intact this study’s 
primary hypothesis, that the gap between democracy in theory and autocracy in practice remains large in Liberia.      
Table 2, for “Trust National Election Commission,” shows that 20.8% of urban males, 27.6% of 
rural males, 15.3% of male English speakers, and 28.4% of male Kpelle-English speakers perceived that 
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the commission is trusted “a lot” compared to 15.1% of urban females, 18.6% of rural females, 8.6% of 
female English speakers, and 20.7% of female Kpelle-English speakers. These measurements reveal that 
female respondents perceived the National Election Commission as “not at all” trusted by 26.8% and 
trusted “a lot” by 17.0% compared to male respondents by 24.4% and 24.4% respectively. In other words, 
fewer female respondents perceived the commission as trusted “a lot” and more perceived it as “not at 
all” trusted compared to their male counterpart, validating this study’s initial hypothesis.  
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Table 2: Q49C—Trust National Election Commission 
Table 3 for “freedom to choose preferred candidate” reveals that 80.3% of urban males, 89.5% of rural 
males, 74.3% of male English speakers, and 89.9% of male Kpelle-English speakers perceived themselves as being 
“completely free” to choose their preferred candidate compared to 75.0% of urban females, 82.6% of rural females, 
69.7% of female English speakers, and 83.2% of female Kpelle-English speakers. These measurements showed 
that urban respondents (77.6%) and English speakers (72.0%) perceived themselves as being less “completely free” 
to choose their preferred candidate than rural respondents (86.1%) and Kpelle-English speakers (86.5%). However, 
female respondents (79.0%) perceived being less “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate than male 
respondents (85.1%). In addition, female English speakers (69.7%) perceived being the least, while rural males 
(89.5 percent) and male Kpelle-English Speakers (89.9%) perceived being the most “completely free” to choose a 
preferred candidate. Generally, all the subgroups have a low perception of being “not at all free” to choose a 
preferred candidate.    
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Table 3: Q15C—Freedom to Choose Preferred Candidate 
Overall, a comparison of the subgroups based on the dependent variables validates that respondents’ 
demographics have an effect on their perception of corruption in Liberia’s 2005 national election. However, the 
study’s expectations about rural and female respondents were not fully accurate. For example, urban males and 
male English speakers rather than rural females and female Kpelle-English speakers were expected to perceived 
the election as more “completely free and fair” and being more “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate 
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because they are the most privileged in Liberian society. However, the analyzed data produce an opposite result. 
On the other hand, females more frequently perceived the National Election Commission as “not at all” trusted 
and felt less “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate, which was anticipated because they are the least 
privileged. It seems likely that privilege is one factor in perception of corruption and freedom, but other factors 
are probably at play. The nature of these factors, however, is beyond the scope of this study.    
 
4.1 Analysis of 2011 Election Data 
The study performed an additional cross-tabulation analysis and produced three contingency tables on the 2011 
election data (Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey administered in 2015) to verify if Liberia’s political climate has 
changed (due to new policy implementation) since 2008, when the 2005 election data (Afrobarometer Round 4 
Survey) was collected for the finding reported in my dissertation. A comparison of both results reveals that 
Liberia’s political situation has not changed. 
Table 4, which contains data on “election freeness and fairness” (from Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey) 
reveals that 17.5% of urban men, 15.6% of rural men, 18.3% of male English speakers, and 15.7% of male Kpelle 
speakers perceived the 2011 election as “completely free and fair,” compared to 19.3% of urban women, 23.0% 
of rural women, 18.4% of female English speakers, and 22.6% of female Kpelle speakers. Furthermore, 35.4% of 
urban respondents and 30.8% of English speakers perceived the 2011 election as less “free and fair with major 
problems” compared to 43.1% of rural respondents and 43.1% of Kpelle speakers, respectively. In addition, more 
rural men (25.5%) and fewer female English speakers (14.1%) perceived the 2011 election as “free and fair with 
major problems,” while more rural women (23.0%) and fewer rural men (15.6%) and male Kpelle speakers (15.7%) 
perceived the election as “completely free and fair.” Even though urban respondents (45.9%) and English speakers 
(50.7%) had a high perception of the election as “not free and fair” those who perceived the least and most fairness 
were rural men (12.4%) and female English speakers (28.1%), respectively. Overall, urban residents and English 
speakers perceived the 2011 election as less free and fair than did rural residents and nonnative English speakers. 
This result is consistent with the 2005 survey (Afrobarometer Round 4) data analyzed in my dissertation. 
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Table 4: Q22-Election Freeness and Fairness 
Table 5 for “trust National Election Commission” shows that 25.9% of urban males, 28.6% of rural males, 
24.3% of male English speakers, and 28.4% of male Kpelle speakers perceived that the Liberia National Election 
Commission is trusted “not at all” compared to 25.3% of urban females, 30.6% of rural females, 24.3% of female 
English speakers, and 29.6% of female Kpelle speakers, showing that overall females mistrust the National 
Election Commission more than males. On the other hand, 14.3% of urban males, 11.7% of rural males, 13.0% of 
male English speakers, and 13.0% of male Kpelle speakers perceived that the commission is trusted “a lot” 
compared to 11.9% of urban females, 13.7% of rural females, 11.4% of female English speakers, and 13.3% of 
female Kpelle speakers. These measurements reveal that female respondents perceived the National Election 
Commission as “not at all” trusted by 28.0% and trusted “a lot” by 12.9% compared to male respondents by 27.3% 
and 13.0% respectively. In other words, fewer female respondents perceived the commission as trusted “a lot” and 
more perceived it as “not at all” trusted compared to their male counterpart, validating (once again) this study’s 
initial hypothesis.  Even though, the difference in percentage of perception among both groups is small and not 
statistically significant.. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.6, No.7, 2016 
 
13 
 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.6, No.7, 2016 
 
14 
 
Table 5: Q52C-Trust National Election Commission 
Table 6 for “freedom to choose preferred candidate” reveals that 84.9% of urban males, 73.4% of rural 
males, 87.1% of male English speakers, and 75.4% of male Kpelle speakers perceived themselves as being 
“completely free” to choose their preferred candidate compared to 83.2% of urban females, 67.8% of rural females, 
87.6% of female English speakers, and 69.5% of female Kpelle speakers. These measurements showed that rural 
respondents (70.6%) and Kpelle speakers (72.4%) perceived themselves being less “completely free” to choose a 
preferred candidate than urban respondents (84.0%) and English speakers (87.4%). However, female respondents 
(75.1%) perceived being less “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate than male respondents (78.9%). 
In addition, rural females (67.8%) perceived being the least, while male English speakers (87.1%) and female 
English speakers (87.6%) perceived being the most “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate. Generally, 
all the subgroups have a low perception of being “not at all free” to choose a preferred candidate. That is, all groups 
believe they have a high degree of personal autonomy in casting their vote, although significantly less so among 
rural females, a result that strongly supports my initial hypotheses.   
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Table 6: Q15C-Freedom to Choose Preferred Candidate 
 
5. Chi-Square Test 
The chi-square test result is used to confirm whether the relationship between respondents’ gender, residence, and 
feeling that the election is “free and fair” are statistically significant. The chi-square value for males is 18.777 with 
a p-value of 0.002, while the Chi-Square value for females is 9.422 with a p-value of 0.151. This male p-value 
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(0.002) is less than the study’s “two tailed” confidence level of 0.05. Therefore, this is strong evidence against the 
null hypothesis that among males, residence, and “election free and fair” are not associated within the sample 
population. However, the p-value (0.151) for females indicates insufficient evidence against the null hypothesis 
that residence and “election free and fair” are associated within the sample population. In other words, at the 
study’s 0.05 percent significance level it fails to reject the null hypothesis that residence and “election free and 
fair” are related among female respondents, while among male respondents the null hypothesis can be confidently 
rejected. 
 The study’s control for gender creates a partial association in which the relationship between residence 
and “election free and fair” is not significant overall. However, a partial association remains for male respondents. 
In conclusion, respondents’ gender does appear to have an impacted on their perception of fairness in Liberia’s 
2005 national election. In other words, residence seems to affect male respondents.       
Correlation Analysis 
A correlation analysis of the Afrobarometer Round 4 survey data reveals that gender, residence, and 
ethnicity have a “two tailed” statistical significance at alpha level of “0.05” in association with respondents’ 
perception of corruption of fairness of “Q71,” “Q49C,” and “Q15.” These results satisfy the study’s confidence 
level of 95 degrees and contribute to the independent variables’ discrete nature. 
 
Table 7: Correlation Matrix 
A significant “two tailed” test at .05 confidence level for gender produced p-values of 0.034 for “Q71” 
and 0.003 for “Q15C,” and the same test for residence produced p-values of 0.002 and 0.000 respectively. In 
addition, ethnicity also produced p-values of 0.000 for “Q71,” 0.002 for “Q49C,” and 0.000 for “Q15C.” These p-
values are all less than the study’s “two tailed” confidence level of 0.05. This means that there is statistically 
significant evidence (the strength of relationship is sufficient enough) of a relationship between respondents’ 
gender, residence, and ethnicity and their perception of corruption or fairness in Liberia’s 2005 electoral processes. 
Therefore, the study rejects its Null hypothesis that “respondents’ demographics are not related to their perception 
of corruption in Liberia’s election process” and accepts the alternate hypothesis that they are related.  
Overall, the used of a chi-square test and a correlation analysis produces a validation of association among 
the variables in two ways. First, the chi-square test reveals how subgroups like urban females and rural males 
individually influenced respondents’ perception of election quality and their level of significance. Second, the 
correlation analysis shows the nature and direction of relationships among all six variables and their statistical 
significance. These approaches produce evidence that supports a rejection of the study’s Null hypothesis.   
 
6. Electoral Corruption and the 2005 Liberian Election 
Overall, this study shows the persistent results of a culture of corruption embedded deep in Liberia’s history, and 
that this corruption effects women, rural people, and indigenous tribes. The culture of corruption that exists in the 
Liberian government is fostered by a constitutional mandate that concentrates power in the presidency (Kumar, 
1998; Sawyer, 1992). This presidential power to make appointments creates ethical and institutional issues in a 
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nation with few elective positions—only president, vice president, senator, representative, city mayor, and 
paramount chief—no standard civil servant laws, and a government as the largest employer (Ellis, 1911; Jahr, 
2006; Liebenow, 1987; Pham, 2004). This system allows Liberian presidents to reward their supporters (friends, 
families, cronies, and ethnic groups) with political positions and punish their opponents (critics, competitors, and 
challengers) by denying them government employment. In addition, these individuals have exclusive rights to 
lucrative benefits such as iron ore stocks, land along new roads, government contracts, and compulsory farm labor 
(Clower et al., 1966; Harris, 2012; Liberia Media Center, 2011). In describing presidential power in Liberia’s first 
and second republics (1847-1989), Sawyer (1992) asserted that “In all matters, the role of the president was more 
prominent than a rule of law” (p. 301).  
A corrupt and unequal society was instituted from the beginnings of the Liberian nation. For example, 
the three hinterland provinces that are predominately indigenous people (95% of the population) had no 
representative in the legislature prior to 1944. The constitution was amended in 1944 to give those provinces only 
6 out of 39 members of the House but no senators (Berkeley, 2001; Carrington, 2007; Clower et al., 1966; 
Liebenow, 1987). The patronage relationship between Liberian presidents and their appointees gave Americo-
Liberians political and economic control of the nation while undermining administrative structures in public 
institutions (Boas, 2009; Harris, 2012).  
This corrupt and unequal practice continues today through the denial of election information, voter 
education, and access to voting machines precincts for rural voters (mostly indigenous people), which limits their 
ability to fully participate in elections (Elklit, 1999). The behavior is also perpetuated by police officers and tribal 
chiefs (public officials) who usually manipulate and intimidate rural citizens to cast their vote for candidates of 
the ruling party (Rand Corporation, 2007; Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2010). These administrative and political 
problems make it difficult for rural voters to support their preferred candidates, which skew’s election results in 
favor of incumbent candidates. In other words, the corrupted presidential power of appointment, a constitutional 
mandate, impedes the conduct of elections (Pastor, 1999). 
Pastor (1999) recognized that Liberia’s election system is plagued with administrative (election 
commission) and political (coercive power) problems that exist simultaneously. However, the issue of focus here 
is electoral administrative failure that originates from public corruption. Specifically, the electoral administration’s 
technical irregularities were the main issue inhibiting the fairness of Liberia’s 2005 Presidential election, even 
though voters, candidates, and opposition parties assumed it was the Election Commission’s bias toward 
incumbents (Harris, 2012; Pastor, 1999). This occurred because during elections, voters are functioning in an 
intensely politicized atmosphere. For example, the lack of recent census data during the 2005 Presidential election 
was responsible for irregularities in the registering of voters, establishment of precincts, and notification of voters 
about election activities (Harris, 2012; Pastor, 1999). 
The effective administration of elections is a prerequisite to transitioning Liberia into a democracy. 
Therefore, the legislature should enact a policy that places the Election Commission outside of government and 
establishes a professional civil servant system for recruiting bureaucrats (Pastor, 1999). Such a policy will ensure 
that Liberia’s Election Commission is beyond the control of governmental regimes and help to hire competent 
individuals as commissioners. The appointment of qualified election officials will minimize corruption (bribery 
for votes) and technical irregularities in Liberia’s electoral processes through ensuring voter registration, 
enforcement of campaign rules, qualification of parties, fair counting of votes, and legitimate establishment of 
precinct. A good start would be a policy that institutes Pastor’s (1999) third model for electoral management bodies, 
which suggested that “An independent election commission manned by experts and directly accountable to the 
parliament” (p. 12) will be effective at conducting elections.  
Legislation to place the Liberian Election Commission outside of government is a strategy that will 
eliminate presidential power of appointment, insulate corruption, enhance election quality, and decrease voters’ 
perception that the conduct of elections is manipulated (Pastor, 1999). For example, in 1990 the Mexicans wrote 
a new constitution that limited presidential succession to prevent election fraud (Pastor, 1999). A similar approach 
was also used in Costa Rica in 1948, where the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was made a fourth branch of 
government whose administrators (magistrates) are elected (Pastor, 1999).     
The existence of laws that provide suffrage for Liberian citizens and the implementation of multiparty 
elections do not ensure full voter participation, which is critical in establishing and maintaining democracy in a 
political system (Bollen, 2009; Moon et al., 2006). For example, the 2005 election record revealed that 90% of 
eligible voters registered to vote. However, only 74.1% participated in the first round of elections and 61% 
participated in the runoff presidential election (Liberia National Election Commission, 2005; Soderstorm, 2008). 
These low turnout rates can be attributed to barriers like inaccessible election information, patronage arrangements, 
and purchase of citizens votes (Berkeley, 2001; Elklit, 1999; Pham, 2004; Soderstorm, 2008), obstacles that make 
it difficult for opposition parties to campaign effectively and restrict citizens from exercising their civil rights. This 
situation had an adverse impact on voter participation and party  competition in the 2005 presidential elections. A 
low turnout of 74% (first round of election) in the 2005 election indicates disaffection with the process (Bollen, 
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2009). Therefore, Free House’s classification of Liberia as “partly free” is subject to question because the nation 
appears to have a minimum level of democracy.  
The decline in participation measured by the differential between voter registration and voter turnout in 
the 2005 (first and second rounds) Presidential elections can be attributed to citizens’ discontent with corruption 
in Liberia’s electoral process. This argument is supported by a governance survey, which indicates that respondents 
“bear a high distrust” for the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches’ commitment in confronting corruption 
by 75%, 81%, and 81% respectively ratings (Liberia Democracy Watch, 2010). Therefore, the classification of 
Liberia as an “Electoral Democracy” is inaccurate. Liberia’s current governmental regime suggests that the 
political system is in transition and moving toward democracy because it holds regular, free, fair, and competitive 
elections. In addition, the elections are genuinely conducted with some democratic qualities (Freedom House, 2010; 
Howard & Roessler, 2006; Lindberg, 2007). However, such a political condition will usually apply to nations with 
independent election commissions, which is lacking in Liberia. The independence of an election institution will 
allow it to promote “prodemocratic” ideas and a mindset among citizens (Lindberg, 2007).   
 
7. Result and Discussion 
These findings provide sufficient evidence to prove that voters’ demographics are related to their perception of 
quality regarding Liberia’s election processes. They are also validated by a chi-square test and a correlation 
analysis, which reveal respondents’ demographic influence on their perception of election quality and the 
relationships among all six variables. Moreover, the findings confirm that voters perceived Liberia’s electoral 
processes as corrupt. 
The underlying cause for this problem is not only political, but also administrative. In other words, the 
nation’s dysfunction stems from a lack of coordination between its administrative and governing systems that has 
resulted in weak public institutions (Weber, as cited in Tompkins, 2005). The administrative institutions existed 
in the form of nepotism, patrimonialism, and indirect rule, which have fostered Americo-Liberians’ and 
contemporary regimes’ abuse of authority (Liebenow, 1987; Pham, 2004; Sawyer, 1992). Moreover, these 
autocratic governments have used regular elections as a means of publicizing their ostensible democratization 
while in actuality evolving into a one-party state, disenfranchising voters, and banning political parties during the 
20th century (Crower et al., 1966; Harris, 2012; Liebenow, 1987; Sawyer, 1992). This has happened even though 
it is known that holding elections in an “authoritarian state construct” does not enhance democratization (Kieh, as 
cited in Saine et al., 2011). In addition, the administration of a constitutional government through patronage 
relationships has given Liberian presidents enormous power. This authority is then used to appoint relatives, 
supporters, and partisans as leaders of election management institutions such as the National Election Commission, 
the National Police Force, and the Supreme Court. The qualifications or competencies of such appointees are not 
important as long as they are the president’s favorites.   
An autocratic state has long existed in Liberia because nepotistic or patriarchal institutions are incapable 
of providing effective oversight for election management organization, thereby making public officials susceptible 
to mismanaging resources, rigging elections, and demanding bribes to perform their responsibility (Fukuyama, 
2004; Rand Corporation, 2007; Moyo, 2009). These problems have made it difficult for Liberia’s electoral 
management institution to administer an equitable election, in turn creating citizen distrust in the National Election 
Commission and lack of confidence in the election process. The Afrobarometer survey of voting-age Liberians 
revealed that 78% of respondents trusted the National Election Commission “some,” “just a little,” or “not at all,” 
whereas 92%, 91%, and 90% of them perceived “some,” “most,” or “all” government officials, police officers, 
and judges and magistrates, respectively, as being corrupt (Tokpa et al., 2009). As a result, the study concludes 
that Liberia’s election process is corrupt because it lacks an independent and a competent electoral administration. 
This has made Liberia a predominantly autocratic state, despite being classified as an “electoral democracy,” in a 
“warning status” of failure, or a “partly free” nation (Freedom House, 2012; The Fund for Peace, 2011). 
 
8. Conclusion 
The appropriate way to transform Liberia’s corrupt political and economic systems is to enact new legislation that 
mitigates public corruption. The effective administration of elections is a prerequisite to transitioning Liberia into 
a democracy. Therefore, the legislature should enact a policy that establishes a professional civil servant system 
for recruiting bureaucrats and places the Election Commission outside of government (Pastor, 1999). Such a policy 
will ensure that Liberia’s Election Commission is beyond the control of governmental regimes and help to appoint 
competent individuals as commissioners. Qualified election officials will then minimize technical irregularities 
and corruption in Liberia’s electoral processes through ensuring voter registration, enforcement of campaign rules, 
qualification of parties, fair counting of votes, and legitimate establishment of precinct. As indicated earlier, a 
good start would be a policy that institutes Pastor’s (1999) third model for electoral management bodies, which 
suggested that “an independent election commission manned by experts and directly accountable to the parliament” 
will be effective at conducting elections (p. 12). Legislation to place the Liberian Election Commission outside of 
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government is a strategy that will eliminate presidential power of appointment, enhance election quality, insulate 
the commission from corruption, and decrease voters’ perception that the conduct of elections is manipulated 
(Pastor, 1999).  
Such a structural reform initiative will revitalize the election management institutions, including the 
national election commission, police force, judicial system, and government officials, and foster effective 
governance in Liberia’s electoral processes (Crocker, 2003; Rotberg, 2002). In other words, this transformation 
will help Liberia’s government adhere to democratic principles, thereby allowing it to successfully implement 
policies through appropriate coordination between its bureaucracy and its constitutional government (Weber, as 
cited in Tompkins, 2005). Moreover, a continuous assessment of Liberia’s election process is essential, as 
democracy takes time to evolve in autocratic systems. The consolidation of democracy in Liberia can be 
determined by observing electoral turnovers in presidential elections. The “two turnover test” requires three 
multiparty presidential contests resulting in opposition candidates’ winning each election and the defeated 
incumbents all relinquishing power to the winning parties without conflict (Huntington, 1991). In addition to this 
test, ongoing research about administrations, processes, and the legitimacy of Liberia’s elections is needed to 
determine the country’s authenticity as an electoral democracy. Achieving such a political system would resolve 
the inequities that indigenous people have long encountered and restore Liberia’s ability to enforce laws that keep 
its politician and privileged groups in compliance (Fukuyama, 2004).     
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